I am constrained to say that we have failed to foster the tradition of political assertion that had been built up by our forefathers. The political system wherein we are being placed might be entirely different from what is used to be in the days of our forefathers. But the spirit that drove them to fight against political dominance should continue in us. As one can observe it, we have so far basked in complacency with our past glory and fame. In other words, we have completely lost political will and direction. We are at the cross-road of political wilderness.
Yet, it is incumbent that in this year of octogenarian anniversary of the Anglo-Kuki war of 1917-19, we ought to recall some anecdotes of the historic events as reminiscences to the memory of our forefathers whose heroic deeds set direction for our contemporary politicians and their politics.
The Anglo-Kuki war of 1917-19, which led to the British conquest of the Kuki Hills was a War fought against the British expansionist Imperialism. According to Sir Robert Reid (1942-49) it was “The most serious (event) in the history of Manipur.”1 This War lasted two and a half years beginning from January 28, 1917 to May 20, 1919. It marked the end of an era and beginning of a new one in the long history of the Kukis who struggled against the British since 1777 A.D. when the Raja of Chittagong sought protection of the British authority from the outrageous atrocities, raids, attacks, etc, on the British subjects by the Kukis.
The era of independence of the Kukis and their over lordship in the hills surrounding the valley of Manipur came to an end and threat of the British rule commenced with the opening of three Sub-divisional Headquarters each at Churachandpur, Tamenglong and Ukhrul, appointing three British Officers belonging to Assam Civil Service Cadre in the persons of B.C. Gasper, William Shaw and L.L. Peter.
II. Resistance to British Imperialism
Palit (1983:81) said that “Mention has been made earlier that the Kukis had been encouraged by emissaries from Bengali Nationalists in Assam, but any thouth that the Germans had also had ao hand in it had not occurred to anyone”. And yet, Borpujari, (1981:218) an Assamese Historian Scholar, observed that “the German spies, had a secret hand in fermenting the War.” Thus, contemporary Indian Nationalists looked at it as an Indian resistance to British Imperialism and for the Kukis and their Chiefs it was a ‘Great Nationalist Revolution’ struggled for defence of their independence.
III. Causes of War
a). Direct Causes:
i) It was an expression of alienation from the Maharajah of Manipur in whom the Kukis saw an ‘ally-turned-deserter.’ It was, therefore, in defiance to the commitment of the Maharajah of Manipur made to the British to send the Kukis to France without prior consultation with Kuki Chiefs as was the practice that existed then.
ii) It was manifestation of a long and deep-rooted tribal discontent, which had been lying latent. It was an outburst of tribal pride and prestige against oppressive measures and high-handedness of the British, and an instance of insolent reply to subdue arrogance of the British.
When the British made the call to the Kukis to join the non-combatant force at the battlefront in France in the 1st World War, the appeal ran as follows:
“If ever there was a time to help their King and country, it is now”.
This appeal hurts the tribal sentiment and pride of the Kukis to the core. There was no alternative. The reaction of the Kukis was obvious. They immediately rose in armed struggle with a vow that
“If ever there was a time to commit themselves to their Chiefs for protection of their independence, culture, tradition, etc., it is now.”
They knew only to fight War against enemy and nothing sort of it and plunged into the greatest War ever occurred against British in the Military history of India” that eclipsed all previous such operations for which Palit said, “The Kukis proved a formidable foe, as staunch in battle as the British themselves could be.”
II) Indirect Causes:
There are two indirect causes of the War. They are of Emotion and Tradition the essence of which are same with that of the Indian National Movement for Independence.
i) Tradition: To the Kukis the British were alien people; had never been at peace with them since their early contact during Lord Warren Hastings’s time. Presence of the British in their Hills was a threat to their independence and very existence in the eyes of the Kukis ever since they first encountered with them.
SEMANG UPA PACHONG
The Kukis knew nobody but their Chiefs whom they venerated with reverential respect, and whose words were “not to let be dropped on the ground (to be obeyed indispensably)”. Now, their Chiefs have called for War against the British. For the Kukis, there was no option but to obey their Chiefs by the dictates of culture, tradition, and unbreachable allegiance to their blood relationship. Fighting for their independence and survival was supreme. They had to fight and fight they must, in expression of loyalty and solidarity.
Their institution of the Chieftainship known as HAOSA and his Council of Ministers called SEMANG UPA PACHONG and their indigenous religion were very strong and deep-rooted in their social milieu among the Kukis. They were, therefore, cared lest continued presence of the British might possibly weaken, if not completely routed, the institution of HAOSA which was the perennial source of their heritage.
In like manner, Christianity which had become essentially attractive among the younger generation as a life-style was likely to undermine their social values and all that they stood for. This would lead to loosing of their separate identity and the rich cultural heritage in oblivion. Obviously, the Kuki Chiefs had to address themselves with concern.
ii) Emotion: The Kukis believed that there was no Hills like theirs, no Chiefs greater than theirs, no religion more fundamental than theirs, nothing whatsoever to match with their own. To the Kukis, the Englishmen were impure more than Harijan to the Hindu Brahmin, Gentiles to the Jews, etc. They did not like the foreigners to infringe upon their rights of living independently.
The Kukis never accepted the British domination. Their inherent instinct to fight against the design of the British dominance never died in them. The repeated outrages and consequent defeats in the hands of Englishmen never cowed the Kukis down. They were always on the look-out for an opportunity to drive the Englishmen out of their Hills. The Kukis were thoroughly nationalists. They never lost sight of the Nationalist Movements.
IV. First Phase of the War, MARCH 17, 1917
A Triumphant Day for Culture and Tradition:
The War commenced as per Kuki culture and tradition of the war-rite known as HANSANEH and SAJAM-LHA. It was a War-rite performed in symbolic oath taking ceremony by killing Mithun as witness to express their unity and solidarity to fight against the enemy and to partake the meat thereof together. This is normally performed by the senior most head of each clan or sub-clan.
Pieces of flesh of the Mithun thus killed will also be distributed to all the junior Chiefs of the clan who cannot participate in the oath-taking ceremony. Anyone who receives it does not normally refuse to accept it. Refusal amounts to opposition to the decision taken, and consequently social ostracization and physical elimination unless repented.
Accordingly, such rituals to mark being at War with the British was performed by Lhukhomang (Pache), Chief of Chassad and Khotinthang (Kilkhong) Chief of Jampi, on March 17, 1917 and Chiengjapao, Chief of Aisan, in spring (May), 1917. It may not be out of place to mention that Ngullien, Chief of Khuongjang, Piba of Singson clan, also performed the said rite. However, unfortunately, he was later prevailed upon by the British and ultimately withdrew from the War.
Kukis attacks on British and their Loyalists:
With the declaration of War, the Kukis were immediately on Warpath. They attacked on the British outposts. Threats, raids, intimidations, coercion, etc., all over the hill areas in varying degrees were launched. Few instances were that the Kukis attacked their Kuki bretheren loyal to the British in the Southern end of Imphal valley in April to force them switched over their loyalty to them, innocent women and children were warned to be killed and their villages burnt, if not sided with them.
One British Officer was manhandled in July, 1917 and a Kuki captive was rescued from official custody as carried out by the leadership of Ngulkhup, Chief of Lonpi (Mombi) and Ngulbul, Chief of Longya. The Kuki Chiefs further threatened that if the British use force, they would be met with stronger force.
First Battle; Defeat of the British:
In retaliation to show their strength, the Political Agent, Manipur, marched against Ngulkhup of Lonpi and Longya with 80 Assam Rifles sepoys in September under the command of Captain Halliday. As they marched towards Lonpi (Mombi), the British Force was intercepted at Chakpi river-crossing beyond Sugnu and one mile before reaching Lonpi, constructing a strong stockade right in the middle of the road, stoutly defended it against the advancing British Force and repelled the enemy who retreated to Imphal after a prolonged pitched battle with three British soldiers killed whose bodies were left behind and several wounded.
Not being satisfied, on his return from Octal, Higgins, Political Officer, Manipur, marched against Lonpi personally with 100 men of 4th Assam Rifles under the cmmand of Capt. Coote on Oct.17, 1917 to avenge the earlier defeat in the hands of the Kuki warriors. No serious opposition form the Kukis was encountered as the Kukis had already evacuated Lonpi. The British occupied Lonpi and halted till the next day when Mr. Higgins sent words to Ngulkhup to surrender. The Chief of Lonpi refused flatly to comply with, sending an insolent reply which prompted Higgins to burn Lonpi. On their way to Longya, they found decomposed dead bodies of Capt. Halliday’s men left behind on earlier attack to Lonpi.
Kuki attack widespread:
Consequently on burning of Lonpi, Ngulkhup and Ngulbul declared their Hills closed to the British, General Palit said, “However the damage was done to the Chiefs were understandably incensed and followed up the incident with a defiant message swaying that they had closed their country (Hills) to the British.”
In December, Lonpi and Longya Chiefs seeking revenge for burning of Lonpi began series of raids into the southern end of Imphal valley. They were soon joined by other Chiefs of the South-west of Imphal valley.
Ngulbul Killed at Longya Theatre:
In late February, 1918, Captain Montifiere was ordered to march southern side of the valley of Imphal along with a mixed force of Burma and India to Lenlakot so as to retrieve the disaster of Captain Steadman’s column. After successful attack at Haika on the way to Longya, his column was attacked under the command of Ngulbul. Prolonged pitched battle followed, the Kukis retreated evacuating their stockade, Ngulbul was killed while trying to escape from the stockade with his little son in his arm.
For his active service, bravey and for defeat of th Kuki Chief in command of the Southern area, Captain Montifiere was decorated with OBE (Order of the British Empire).
Lt. Molesworth killed at Chassad Theatre:
In mid March, 1918, combined columns of 150 Rifles of 2, 3 & 4 Assam Rifles under Captain Coote with Lt. Parry and Mr. Higgins left for Chassad hills. The column took via Aya Purel and met the column led by Captain Pattrick at Kongkal Thana on the Mangha River. Both the columns marched on northwards and attacked Kamjong, Pache’s principal village, where pitched battle was fought with the Chassad’s warriors wherein several casualties inflicted and in course of fighting Lt. Molesworth was killed.
The two columns then proceeded to Chattik and Maokot where Coote had one man killed and six wounded. Lt. Kay Mauyatt (of Burma) also was seriously wounded. Pache could not be captured. He escaped into the Somra hills.
The situation became from bad to worse. Suspense, fear-psychosis, tensions and rumours of attack and War were afloat. Panic, unrest, nervousness, etc. reigned the entire valley with anarchy in the hill areas as expressed by the Maharajah of Manipur, Sir Churachand Singh, in his letter written to Mr. W.A. Cosgrave Political Agent, Manipur. The state of anarchy was extended to Naga Hills in the North. North-Cachar Hills in the North-west, Lushai Hills in the South and South-west.
Chin Hills and Chindwyn valley in the east and south-east and to the unadministered areas of Somra Tracts in the north-east. Even Imphal was reportedly besieged and Higgins had to rush back to Imphal from Bishnupur on hearing the news abandoning his march against South-western Kuki Chiefs.
V. Second Phase, November 7, 1918
War taken over by the Army.
Under the circumstances, the circumstances, the situation completely went out of the hands of Civil authority. Something had to done with immediate effect. The Chief Commissioner of Assam rushed to Simla personally along with DIG., Assam Rifles, in June 1918 to met the Commander-in-Chief of the British Indian Army to explore ways to augment and strengthen the hands of the Civil authority, if not possible to be taken over by the army. The meeting resulted in the approval of the plan to revamp deployment of more soldiers and modification of warfare strategy with improved arms to be taken over the show by the army from the Civil authority.
Thus, the Army took over the operation from civil administration on November 7, 1918 with a 5,400 strong army personnel both form India and Burma and movement of this combined forces started from November 25, 1918. The Military formation was planned by Major Vickers of 3rd Assam Rifles, Kohima, which was patterned so as to match with the strategy and formations of the Kukis as chalked out by Higgins.
The following are formations of the British Army and the Kuki warriors;
(i) Formation of British Army
While overall operations were under the command of Gen. Sir Henry Keary, stationed at Kendat, Burma, field operations were placed under the direct command of Brig. General Macquoid, stationed at Imphal. His field command staffs were manned by Army Headquarters at Imphal:
1. Commanding Officer: Colonel Ral.
2. Second in Command: Major Vickers, posted at Kohima, Naga Hills.
3. Command Officers: i) Captain Conningham
ii) Captain Henderson
iii) Major O’Nalley, RMO
iv) Lowry Currie
Sl. No. Name of the Areas Place under the Command of
1 Chassad Area
Capt. Parry and Black covering the areas east of Imphal valley with supply base at Yaingangpokpi.
2 Aishan Area (North Tangkhul, Somra and Tezu):
Capt. Prior, Lts. Mawson and Rees, covering areas north-east of Imphal and south-east of Kohima with supply bases at Tadubi and Melomi.
3 Lonpi Area
Capt. Coote & Lt. Ask with covering entire south areas of Imphal valley with supply base at Sugnu.
4 Henglep Area
Placed under the command of Capts. Goodall and Fox, and Lt. Carter covering Manhlun Manchong (Zou) areas, south-west of Loktak Lake with supply base at Moirang.
5 Jampi Area
Maj. Marshall, being assisted by Capt. Montifiere and Lts. Needham and Walker covering areas lying between Barak river and Cart road with Henema and Taphou as supply bases.
In addition, there were four columns from Burma as detailed below:
Name of the Columns
Placed under the Command of
Humalin Aung Kuangken
Capt. Rundall, assisted by Kamhao Chief, Howchingkoop (Hauchinkhup) and his men.
Officers not deployed in the above columns were deployed for mobile columns, transport and Headquarters duties at Imphal.
By mid October, additional Officers arrived at Imphal and were distributed to various areas and duties. They were experienced Officers at different theatres of the Great War and their names were as given below:
1. Capt. W.P. Reid, 2. Lieut. R.G. Back 3. Lt. Scott
4. Lt. C.E. Jeffreys 5. Lt. P.A. Armstrong 6. Lt. H.Congden
7. Lt. Ress. 8. Lt. Goldsmith 9. Lt. Mack
10. Lt. Willis 11. Dr. Crozier.
Similarly, the Kuki Warriors organized themselves as per their respective areas mostly on the line of clan seniority as given below:
(ii) Formation of Kuki Warriors:
In consideration of the jurisdiction and influence extended in the areas of each Chiefs, Higgins, Political Officer, Manipur, divided the formation of Kuki Warriors as given below:
A. Eastern Hills (Chassad Areas):
It was under the command of Lhukhomang (alias Pache), Chief of Chassad, assisted by i) Paokholen, Chief of Bongbal Khulen and ii) Paboi, Chief of Sita. Pache killed one Mithun on March 17, 1917 and distributed the flesh therof to other Chiefs so as to oppose the British in the War. He also sent bullets to the Chiefs of Jampi, Ukha (Loikhai), Songphu, Henglep and Loibol in token expression of urging them to fight the British, and sent invitation to Ngulkhup, Chief of Lonpi (Mombi), and Kilkhong, Chief of Jampi, for a conference to discuss issues relating to strategies and tactics to fight the British.
B. North-Eastern Hills (Aishan Areas):
Chengjapao, Chief of Aishan, was in command of the Area. He killed one buffalo in Spring (May), 1917 and distributed pieces of the flesh to other Chiefs urgig them to fight against the British. He was captured and released on condition that he should persuade Kilkhong, Chief of Jampi, and Pache of Chassad, to stop fighting the British.
C. Southern Hills (Lonpi Areas):
Ngulkhup, Chief of Lonpi, was in command of the Area, assisted by Ngulbul, Chief of Longya and Tonjang of Mualtam. The British Civil authorities were first confronted by the above Chiefs much earlier than other Chiefs. The first battle with the British was fought at Lonpi in September, 1917 in which the British Force was defeated with three dead soldiers whose bodies were left behind in the course of retreat to Imphal being burdened with wounded soldiers.
Ngulkhup was instrumental to influence the Kuki Chiefs form Burma to join the War against the British. He also received invitation form Pache, Chief of Chassad, for a conference and bullet which showed his importance and indispensability to the War efforts of the Kukis
D. South-Western Hills (Henglep Areas):
It was under the command of Pakang, Chief of Henglep, being assisted by i) Semchung, Chief of Ukha (Loikhai), ii) Haoneh, Chief of Nabil, iii) Paosum, Chief of Songphu and iv) entire Chiefs of Manhlun and Manchong (Zou) clans covering the areas from the hills bordering Imphal valley in the north-west to Behiang touching the border with Burma.
He summoned a meeting of 20 Chiefs under his jurisdiction in the month of October, 1917 at Loikhai.
There were more than 40 guns among the Chiefs who attended the meeting including the Chiefs from Manhlun and Manchong clans (Zou).
They encountered with the British Army unawares when a group of young warriors went to the jungle hunting Mithun to be slaughtered in the said meeting wherein a War-rite ceremony in oath-taking ritual to fight the British was to be performed.
E. Western Hills (Jampi Areas):
The area was under the command of Khotinthang (alias Kilkhong), Chief of Jampi. He was assisted by –
i) Tintong, Chief of Laijang, second-in-command of the Area.
ii) Lhunkholal,Chief of Chongjang,
iii) Khupkho, Chief of Langkhong and
iv) Helashon (Helkhoson), Chief of Loibol.
They cover the areas that lie in the North-western hills between Imphal valley and the North-Cachar and Naga hills.
Khotinthang was a mere youth with considerable influence and was nominal head of the whole operation. He killed one Mithun as far back as March 17, 1917 and distributed portions of the flesh to other Chiefs to urge tem to join the War.
Tintong and Lhunkholal were spokesmen at crucial Oktan meeting with J.C. Higgins under the leadership of Tintong. Lhukholal was sent to Chassad to met Pache to deliver War-beeds form Kilkhong after Oktan meeting. Thissignified that they should join hands n the War, in confirmation of their alliance. Pache sent not only War-beeds, but also bullets.
Thus, as the warring sides prepared for the War, battlefronts were scattered and widespread, and it came to an end on May 20, 1919 when the Kukis are subjugated.
On December 19, 1917, State Forest Toll Station at Ithai was attacked. The raid was planned and organized by him with the intention of looting, not being connected with the war.
The raid was led by 4 or 5 Manipuri men of Sanachaoba Singh. The few Kukis involved in the raid were of non-descript individuals who might have joined Sanachaoba on their own. While deposing before the Advisory Tribunal, Semchung, Chief of Loikhai, blamed Chingkhamba Sanachaoba Singh for the incident.
Enjakhup of Thenjol
Enjakhup of Thenjol of Naga Hills was a sepoy of the Naga Hill Battalio for over two years. During his service in the Naga Battalion, he ran into debt. He consequently went over to Manipur State in 1918. Nine charges were farmed against hi. In Manipur, he got in touch with Kilkhong of Jampi and Tintong of Laijang. He was interested himself in the question of Kukis who were to go to France. He went to Imphal where he was arrested for instigating people against the recruitment of Kuki non-combatant force to join allied forces in France. He was placed under parole wherefrom he escaped and rejoined Chief of Jampi. He played important part I the opposition to the British. He also opposed the recruitment in the meeting held at Oktal in September, 1917.
He along with Tintong went to Naga Hills. There, he made a threat to Henema Kukis not to help the British Government. He tried to get Solim to join the struggle against the British and also the Angami Nagas. He returned to Manipur. He took part in the battle on the side of Henama-Jampi column of 1917-18. He organized and trained a standing force of 20 to 60 muskets to fight against the British. He organized the attacks on the Dulen Guard and burning of Santing village and Dulen village. He made tour with 20 muskets west of the Barak river in the rainy season of 1918 to collect supplies and guns. He fought during the cold weather of 1918-1919 upto the time of his capture.
The Advisory Tribunal recommended for Enjakhup for the term of his natural life. For several years to come he had to be detained in jail. Warrants for Ngulkhokhai, Enjakhup and Chingakhamba Sanachaoba Singh were signed by R.E. Holland, Secretary to the Government of India on October, 1919 addressed to the Superintendent of Jail, Dibrugarh, for placing the three persons under personal restraint as per provision of Regulation III of 1818.
VI. Trial of the Kuki Chiefs
As the War came to a close, the Kuki Chiefs were put under trial as War Criminals for waging War against the British by an Advisory Tribunal under Regulation – III of 1818. It was constituted with a two member Advisory Tribunal comprising of W.J.Reid, I.C.S. and W.C.M. Dunda, I.P.
In forwarding the recommendations of the Advisory Tribunal to the Government of India, the Chief Commissioner of Assam expressed his opinion that the Kuki Chiefs were “more sinned against than sinning.”
Replying to the recommendations in October, 1919, the Government of India decided that ‘Policy of Clemency’ was “both called for and justified,” and accordingly, none of the Chiefs was confined in Jail except three Persons, not really Chiefs, who were very seriously to blame. The ten Chiefs, separated from the three persons whose antecedents as were found by the Advisory Tribunal were as follows.
1. Ngulkhokhai of Chassad:
Ngulkhokhai of Chassad was not a Chief. Two charges were put up against him. He took part in armed struggle against the British. He deliberately murdered four Manipuri traders near Kangui I January, 1918. The Advisory Tribunal found hi as an ordinary Kuki. The Tribunal recommended his detention for a period of five years. Greater part of his detention should be either at Tezpur or Dibrugarh jail.
2. Chingakhamba Sanachaoba Singh:
Chingakhamba Sanachaoba Singh was of a common birth and had no social position. He was merely an unscrupulous and clever adventure. He took advantage of the situation in the Hills in order to place himself in a better position. He claimed to possess supernatural powers. He circulated bullets and other materials in order to stir up armed struggle against the British Government. He cheated the Kukis pretending that he was the elder brother of Maharajah of Manipur so as to establish himself as such.
It is pertinent that in order to understand the Anglo-Kuki War in its right perspective, comment of Higgins on the unity of the Kukis due to influence of their culture and tradition cannot be over emphasized. He said,
“I do not think the Kuki was less known than other tribes. Personally, I have had more to do with them and have toured among them far oftener than among other tribes. But I must admit that I was entirely wrong in my estimate of the degree to which the Kukis could be expected to combine. They have never done so before and in that lay their weakness. That is the reason why the Lushai and the Northern Chin, to my nind, far inferior to the Kukis, man for man were able to worst the Kukis and drive them north. My only excuse for this miscalculation is that it was entirely shared by all the Kuki interpreters, who mighthave been expected to know their own people better than I could be expected to do.”
Dr. Thangkhotinmang Selpho Gangte a.k.a TS Gangte (deceased) was the Director of Education and Chairman of Council of Higher Secondary Education, Manipur, India. He was one of the first to have done extensive research work on the Anglo-Kuki War 1917-1919 (This article was first published sometime in 1999).
Name of author
Title of Book
Problem of the Hill Tribes, North-East Frontier, 1973-1962, Vol. III
Spectrum Publications, Gauhati, Assam
British Relation with Hill Tribes of Assam
Palit, D.K., Vr.C., F.R.G.S. Maj.Gen
The Sentinels of North-East
Reid, Robert, Sir.
History of Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam form 1883-1941
Government of Assam, Shillong
Shakespear. L.W., Col.
History of Assam Rifles.
Spectrum Publications, Pan Bazar, Gauhati, Assam
1. Confidential letter No. 5c dt. March 17, 1917 from H.W.G.Cole, Political Agent, Manipur to B.C. Allen, ICS, Special Officer.
2. Letter dt. May 22, 1918 from Maharajah of Manipur to P.A. Main.
3. Higgins,J.C.’s letter No. 705 MS dt. Nov. 24/25, 1917
4. Letter No. 110-4 dt. Janurary 31, 1917 of B.C. Allen, Special Officer, Shillong.
5. J.C. Higgins’ Note to Political Agent, Manipur, with reference to letter DO No. 1608 dt. March 7, 1918 from Chief Secretary, Shillong, enclosed by W.A.Cosgrave, Political Agent, Manipur, in his confidential letter no. 2GA. Dt. April 5, 1918 address to C.S.Shillong.
 Chakravorty B.C. (1964): British Relations with the Hill Tribes of Assam, since 1958, p53.
 Palit, D.K. Maj. Gen. (1964): The Sentinels of the North-East. p81.
 Borpujari, H.K. (1981): Problems of the Hill Tribes, North-East Frontier, 1873-1962, p218.
 DO letter No. 110-4. issued on January 31.1917 by B.C. Allen. Special Officer Assam, Shilling.
 Palit. D.K. Maj. Gen. (1983): The Sentinels of the North-East. p82.
 Chakravorty. B.C.(1964): British Relations with the Hill tribes of Assam since 1858, p47-52.
 Confidential letter No.5c dt. March 17,1917 from Lt.Col. H.W.G. Cole./A-CSI,P.A. Manipur, to the Hon’ble B.C. Allen, ICS, Special Officer, Shillong.
 Shakespear, W, Col (1929): History of the Assam Rifles, p213.
 Palit, D.K, Maj Gen.(1983): The Sentinels of the North-East, p62.
 Maharajah of Manipur’s letter dated May 22, 1918 to P.A. Manipur.
 Shakespear, W.Col.(1929): History of Assam Rifles, p232
 Higgins J.C.s letter No. 705 MS dt. Nov., 24/25, 1917.
 J.C Higgins in his Note to Political Agent Manipur, with reference to letter DO no. 1608 dated, 7th March, 1918 from C.S. enclosed by W.A. Cosgrave, Plitical Agent vide his confidential letter No. 2 GA, dated the 5th April 1918 addressed to C.S. Shillong.